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IS THE WAR ON TERRORISM COMPROMISING CIVIL
LIBERTIES? A DISCUSSION OF HAMDI AND PADILLA
Like an answer, the three slogans on the white face of the Ministry of
Truth came back to him:
WAR IS PEACE
FREEDOM IS SLAVERY
IGNORANCE IS STRENGTH.'
In George Orwell's novel 1984, the governing political party prided it-
self with providing continuous "peace," which it achieved through war.'
"Big Brother" dictated the lives of its subjects and for all intents and pur-
poses was the watchdog that kept this political system intact, due in large
part to the systematic and intrusive intelligence surveillance system that
monitored the everyday lives of civilian citizens. These citizens were made
to believe that giving up their privacy and freedom was a small price to pay
in exchange for guaranteed security and safety.
United States citizens now find themselves confronting a similar fate.
As currently defined by the United States government, an enemy combatant
is afforded none of the guarantees provided for in the Constitution. As a re-
sult, the government stipulates that an enemy combatant can 1) be indefi-
nitely detained, 2) have no charges filed against him/her, and 3) be denied
access to a lawyer. The government justifies this detention on the theory that
national security might be compromised if military decision-making is sec-
ond-guessed.3
This Comment will present a general overview and discussion of the le-
gal implications involved in labeling a United States citizen an enemy com-
batant for the purpose of detaining that individual without judicial review for
an undetermined period of time. Part I will identify and set forth the facts of
the current cases that deal with the issue of post-9/11 incommunicado deten-
tion of United States citizens as enemy combatants, namely, Padilla v. Bush'
1. GEORGE ORWELL, 1984, 25-26 (Signet Classic 1992) (1949).
2. See generally id.
3. Respondent's Response to, and Motion to Dismiss, the Amended Petition for a Writ of
Habeas Corpus at 11, Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (No. 02 Civ.
4445) (hereinafter Respondent's Motion to Dismiss].
4. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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and Hamdi v. Rumsfeld' In addition, this section will identify cases where
suspected U.S. citizen terrorists and non-U.S. citizen terrorists, have not
been labeled enemy combatants, and, instead, have been charged and given
access to counsel-these cases will demonstrate a stark contrast to Hamdi
and Padilla's situation. Part II will explain who is entitled to the rights enu-
merated in the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Prisoners of
War (Third Geneva Convention) and the implications this has on an individ-
ual labeled an enemy combatant. Part III will discuss and distinguish Ex
Parte Quirin,6 which the government heavily relies on as precedent for de-
taining U.S. citizens as enemy combatants without judicial review. Part IV
will examine the lack of a standardized set of rules to determine who is or is
not an enemy combatant and discuss how this may be in violation of the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Part V will ex-
plain why the Padilla decision to allow access to counsel for the writ of ha-
beas corpus is correct. In addition, Part V will set forth suggestions to ensure
compliance with the ICCPR.
I. BACKGROUND
On September 11, 2001, terrorists executed an attack on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon. Terrorists hijacked four planes, three which
reached their respective targets and one which crashed just short of its target
due to the heroic efforts of its passengers.7 The ensuing tragic events resulted
in the loss of approximately 3,000 lives.' The United States government
found the al-Qaeda network to be the perpetrator behind these senseless
acts.9 In response, Congress gave President Bush its approval to use what-
ever force necessary to bring those responsible to justice."0 President Bush
subsequently initiated military operations in Afghanistan."
5. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450 (4t Cir. 2003).
6. Ex Parte Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
7. Associated Press, Establishing Final Toll May Be Weeks Away, S.D. UNION TRIB.,
Sept. 12, 2001, at Al.
8. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 296 F.3d 278, 279 (4h Cir. 2002).
9. Id.
10. Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
The exact language of the Joint Resolution states:
[T]he President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against
those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, com-
mitted or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001 ... in or-
der to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States.
Id.
11. Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 280.
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A. United States Citizen Terrorist Suspects Who Have Been Denied Due
Process
1. Yasser Esam Hamdi
Yaser Esam Hamdi is a United States citizen who was captured by
American and Allied Forces in Afghanistan. 2 The United States government
believes he surrendered as a member of the Taliban in the Fall of 2002.'"
Originally, the government did not know that Hamdi was a U.S. citizen." As
a result, he was taken to Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba in January
2002.'" In April 2002, once it was discovered that Hamdi had been born in
Louisiana, he was transferred to the Norfolk Naval Station Brig in Virginia. 6
The U.S. government labeled Hamdi an enemy combatant, detained him in-
definitely, failed to bring charges against him, and denied him access to
counsel. '"
Hamdi's father, Esam Fouad Hamdi, filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus under the legal relationship of "next of friend."' 8 The district court
held that Hamdi's father sufficiently fulfilled the next of friend criteria. 9 In
addition, the district court appointed Hamdi counsel and ruled that the gov-
ernment must allow Hamdi unmonitored meetings with his appointed coun-
sel.20
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the court of appeals reversed the district court's
decision and held that proper weight was not given to national security con-
cerns when the court granted Hamdi access to counsel.' Furthermore, the
court stated "the President's wartime detention decisions are to be accorded
great deference from the courts."2
The government took an even more radical position by requesting that
the court of appeals dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus without
leave to amend because the government's judgment as to who is an enemy
combatant is not subject to judicial review, since this would result in an in-
12. Id.
13. Warren Richey, Terror on Trial: Citizen Detentions in the Spotlight (Sept. 26, 2002),
at http://news.findlaw.com/csmonitor/s/20020926/26sep2O02110255.html.
14. Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 280.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 279. Next of friend status can be granted to an individual who is (1) acting on
the behalf of a defendant who is unable to appear on his own behalf and (2) has a significant
relationship with the defendant and will ensure that the defendant's best interests are upheld.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 294 F.3d 598, 603 (4"' Cir. 2002).
19. Hiamdi, 296 F.3d at 279.
20. Id.
21. Id. at282-83.
22. Id. at 282 (citing Ex Parte Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942)).
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validation of executive policy. 3 The court, however, refused to summarily
dismiss the petition for writ of habeas corpus because it did not want to en-
dorse the proposition that a citizen alleged to be an enemy combatant is not
entitled to "meaningful judicial review ... on the government's say-so."24
The court, however, held that "if Hamdi is indeed an 'enemy combatant'
who was captured during hostilities in Afghanistan, the government's pre-
sent detention of him is a lawful one.
25
Upon remand, the district court directed the government to answer
Hamdi's petition for writ of habeas corpus.26 Along with its response, the
government submitted an affidavit from Michael Mobbs ("Mobbs Declara-
tion"), a special advisor to the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. 27 The
Mobbs Declaration contained information regarding Hamdi's capture that
allegedly confirmed and validated his detention as an enemy combatant.28 In
response, the district court held that the Mobbs Declaration was insufficient
evidence and ordered the government to produce more evidence. 29 The gov-
ernment appealed this decision.3"
On January 8, 2003, the court of appeals held that the Mobbs Declara-
tion, without more, was sufficient to justify Hamdi's detention.' The court
reasoned that to hold otherwise risked creating "judicial involvement...
into an area where the political branches have been assigned by law a pre-
eminent role."32 Specifically, the court held that the government's right to
detain Hamdi as an enemy combatant emanates from its war-making powers
of Article I and II of the U.S. Constitution.33 As a result, the court dismissed
Hamdi's petition for writ of habeas corpus because "it [was] undisputed that
he was captured in an [sic] zone of active combat operations abroad," '34 and
the Mobbs Declaration was sufficient to "establish a legally valid basis" for
his detention. The court did, however, make the point that "[j]udicial re-
view does not disappear during wartime, but the review of battlefield cap-
tures in overseas conflicts is a highly deferential one."36
23. Hamdi, 296 F.3d at 283.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 461 (4" Cir. 2003).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 462.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 473.
32. Id. at 470.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 476.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 477.
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2. Jose Padilla
Jose Padilla, also known as Abdullah al-Muhajir, is a United States citi-
zen.37 On May 8, 2002, believing him to be a member of al-Qaeda, the U.S.
government arrested Padilla as he arrived in Chicago on an international
flight from Pakistan." The FBI had become interested in Padilla after inter-
rogating a senior al-Qaeda leader who revealed that Padilla planned to return
to the United States and detonate a dirty bomb.39 According to the informant,
Padilla met with top al-Qaeda officials and proposed constructing a hydro-
gen bomb.' Padilla gained this bomb making knowledge from internet re-
sources which were "laughably inaccurate.""1 Al-Qaeda officials told Padilla
to focus his efforts on making a dirty bomb. 2 Padilla's intentions were to not
only detonate a dirty bomb but to target hotel rooms and gas stations with
other explosive devices. 3
Originally, the government arrested Padilla on a material witness war-
rant and detained him at the Metropolitan Correctional Center in New York
City." After determining Padilla to be an unlawful enemy combatant, the
President, acting as Commander in Chief, transferred him to a high-security
Navy prison in Charleston, South Carolina.4' Interestingly, the government
failed to give Padilla's attorney or the Amici Curiae copies of the military
confinement orders that authorized Padilla's detention.46
On December 4, 2002, the district court announced its decision that the
government has the authority to detain enemy combatants who are United
States citizens for an indefinite period of time. 7 Specifically, the court held
that:
[a]lthough unlawful combatants, unlike prisoners of war, may be tried and
punished by military tribunals, there is no basis to impose a requirement
that they be punished. Rather, their detention for the duration of hostilities
is supportable-again, logically and legally-on the same ground that the
37. Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Security Detainees and the Criminal Justice
System, at http://www.lchr.org/us-lawloss/lossch4b.htm (last visited Nov. 8, 2002) [herein-
after LCHR].
38. Id.
39. Id. A dirty bomb is a "conventional explosive combined with radioactive material."
Associated Press, Padilla Was Told To Lower Sights (June 16, 2002), available at
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2002/06/10/attack/main511671.shtml.
40. Padilla Was Told To Lower Sights, supra note 39.
41. id.
42. Id.
43. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 7.
44. Id. at 6.
45. Id. at 6, 8-9.
46. Brief of Amici Curiae at IIIB, Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564 (S.D.N.Y. 2002)
(No. 02 Civ. 4445) [hereinafter Padilla Amici Curiae Brief].
47. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
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detention of prisoners of war is supportable: to prevent them from rejoin-
ing the enemy."8
The court held, however, that Padilla was entitled to meet with counsel
regarding his petition for writ of habeas corpus. '9 The also court announced
that upon "further submission from Padilla, should, he choose to make
one.., the court will examine only whether there was some evidence to
support the President's finding, and whether that evidence has been mooted
by events subsequent to Padilla's detention."5
B.. United States Citizen Terrorist Suspect Who Has Been Given Due
Process: John Walker Lindh
John Philip Walker Lindh, an American citizen, has become known as
the "American Taliban."5' Northern Alliance and American forces captured
Lindh in Afghanistan while he was fighting with the Taliban" Lindh origi-
nally tried to join the Taliban, but, instead, was referred to al-Qaeda because
his "language skills were insufficient."53 Lindh "spent seven weeks in an al
Qaeda camp training in weapons, explosives and battlefield combat."'
Osama bin Laden visited the camp several times and in fact met with Lindh
and thanked him for his participation. After Lindh completed his training,
he fought in Afghanistan at the front lines up until his capture. 6
A federal district court in Virginia indicted Lindh on various charges,
including conspiracy to murder nationals of the United States overseas. 7 In
July 2002, the Government and Lindh made a plea agreement: Lindh
pleaded guilty to "supplying services to the Taliban ... and to carrying an
explosive during the commission of a felony. 8 On October 4, 2002, the fed-
eral district court in Virginia sentenced him to twenty years in a federal
prison. 9
48. Id. at 593.
49. Id. at 599.
50. Id. at 588.
51. LCHR, supra note 37.
52. United States v. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d 565, 569 (E.D. Va. 2002).
53. Attorney General Transcript, John Walker Lindh Press Conference (Jan. 15, 2002),
available at http://www.usdoj.gov/ag/speeches/2002/011502walkertranscript.htm.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 566 n.2. The court in Lindh held that the Taliban did not
meet the four criteria required to be recognized as a prisoner of war. United States v. Lindh,
212 F. Supp. 2d 541, 557-58 (E.D. Va. 2002).
58. Lindh, 227 F. Supp. 2d at 566.
59. Id. at 572.
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C. Non-Citizen Terrorist Suspects Who Have Been Given Due Process
1. Richard Reid
Richard Reid, a convert to Islam, is a British citizen who was arrested
on December 22, 2001 after attempting to ignite explosives hidden in his
shoe during an international flight from Paris to Miami. 0 Passengers and
flight attendants on board the flight restrained Reid" and upon arrival he was
arrested and later charged with numerous counts, including attempted mur-
der and homicide.62 In his indictment, the government contended that Reid
received training from al-Qaeda in Afghanistan.63 On October 4, 2002, Reid
plead guilty to all the charges against him.'M
2. Zacarias Moussaoui
Zacarias Moussaoui is a French national who has become widely known
as the "twentieth hijacker." 65 The government believes that in 1998 Mous-
saoui attended an al-Qaeda training camp located in Afghanistan.66 He en-
tered the United States with a visa on February 23, 2001, with the apparent
purpose of attending flight school.67 Moussaoui, however,' was arrested on
August 16, 2001 and held on immigration charges when flight instructors at
his school became suspicious because he paid in cash for his tuition, "ex-
pressed an 'unusual interest' in the fact that a plane's doors could not be
opened during flight, and insisted on learning to fly ... despite ... minimal
aptitude for flying."68 A later inspection of Moussaoui's home revealed evi-
dence which linked him to the September 11" attacks, and included knives,
Boeing 747 flight manuals and a flight simulator computer program.69 The
government has thus far charged Moussaoui with conspiracy to commit acts
of terrorism transcending national boundaries, though more charges are
likely.
60. Richard Reid Pleads Guilty (Oct. 5, 2002), available at http://www.cnn.com/
2002/LAW/10/04/reid.guilty.plea/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2002).
61. Id.
62. Indictment, United States v. Reid, No. 02-10013 (D. Mass. Jan. 16, 2002), available
at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/reid/usreidO1 1602ind.pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2003).
63. Id.
64. Richard Reid Pleads Guilty, supra note 60.
65. LCHR, supra note 37.
66. Superseding Indictment at 10, United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-455 (E.D. Va. July
16, 2002), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/moussaoui/usmouss7I602spind.
pdf (last visited Mar. 17, 2003) [hereinafter Moussaoui Indictment].
67. Id. at 14
68. LCHR, supra note 37.
69. Moussaoui Indictment, supra note 66, at 18.
70. Id. at 2.
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The government is currently appealing several issues, one of which is
"whether Moussaoui... should have the right to question.., an al Qaeda
operative [who was] in contact with Moussaoui. '7 The government is con-
cerned that if Moussaoui is given the right to contact those with sensitive in-
formation, the case against him may be compromised.72 As a result, the dis-
trict court has postponed the trial pending the resolution of the government's
appeal .
II. PRISONERS OF WAR V. UNLAWFUL ENEMY COMBATANT STATUS
The 1949 Third Geneva Convention enumerates protections afforded to
prisoners of war. 7" It defines prisoners of war as members of an armed force
"who have fallen into the power of the enemy."" Specifically, it divides
prisoners of war into categories, the most relevant here being:
Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps, includ-
ing those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a Party to the
conflict and operating in or outside their own territory, even if this terri-
tory is occupied, provided that such militias or volunteer corps, including
such organized resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions: (a)
That of being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates;
(b) That of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance; (c)
That of carrying arms openly; (d) That of conducting their operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war.76
The main justification for detaining prisoners of war under the Third
Geneva Convention is "to prevent them from rejoining the enemy."77 Argua-
bly the policy here is to ensure the fair treatment and captivity of lawful
combatants by setting universal standards. Per the Third Geneva Conven-
tion, lawful combatants cannot be subject to prosecution for actions that
would not be deemed unlawful if committed by the captor's soldiers.78 In
other words, the fact that a combatant is taking up arms against an enemy
power is not grounds for prosecution. As a result, prisoners of war may be
detained, without charges or trial, until they are released and repatriated at
the end of the conflict.
71. Associated Press, Moussaoui Trial Suspended (Feb. 12, 2003), available at
http://www.cbsnews.comlstories/2002/O7/22/attack/main515896.shtml (last visited Mar. 17,
2003).
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention No. III].
75. Id. art. 4(A).
76. Id. art. 4(A)(2)(a)-(d).
77. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 610 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).
78. Geneva Convention No. IIl, supra note 74, art. 82.
79. Id. art. 118.
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Individuals who do not qualify as prisoners of war are subject to the
guarantees enumerated in the Geneva Convention relative to the Protection
of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Fourth Geneva Convention)." Conse-
quently, individuals, such as those described earlier in this paper who are
termed unlawful enemy combatants fall within the protections of the Fourth
Geneva Convention." The main distinction between these two categories is
that unlawful enemy combatants may be prosecuted for taking up arms
against an enemy power.
.Interestingly, the term unlawful enemy combatant is not found any-
where in the Geneva Conventions. 2 The U.S. government, however, justifies
its detainment of Hamdi and Padilla by citing several cases which use the
term unlawful enemy combatant as it relates to United States citizens . One
of these cases, Ex Parte Qurin, is discussed in more detail below.
III. DISCUSSION OF Ex PARTE QUIRIN
A. Facts of the Case
The government relies on Ex Parte Quirin, a case that dealt with Nazi
saboteurs who came to the United States as spies,83 as authority for detaining
United States Citizens as enemy combatants. The eight petitioners in Ex
Parte Quirin received training at a sabotage school in Germany and later ar-
rived off the coast of New York in June 1942 aboard a submarine. 4 After the
petitioner's arrest, the President established a Military Commission on July
2, 1942, to prosecute the petitioners. 5 The President also declared that ene-
mies of the United States charged with "sabotage, espionage, hostile or war-
like acts, or violations of the law of war, shall be subject to... the jurisdic-
tion of military tribunals." 6 On July 3, 1942, the government charged
petitioners with violating the laws of war, aiding the enemy, spying, and
conspiracy to commit the charged offenses. 7
The trial before the military tribunal was in progress when the petition-
ers filed a writ of habeas corpus in federal district court.88 The district court
denied the petition for writ of habeas corpus and the Supreme Court granted
80. Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention No. IV]; Human Rights
Watch, Background Paper on Geneva Conventions and Persons Held by U.S. Forces (Jan. 29,
2002), at http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/usa/pow-bck.htm [hereinafter HRW].
81. HRW, supra note 80.
82. Id.
83. Ex Parte Quirin v. Cox, 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 22.
86. Id. at 22-23.
87. Id. at 23.
88. Id.
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certiorari.89 The issue before the Court was "whether the detention of peti-
tioners by [the government] for trial by Military Commission" was constitu-
tional.90
The Court in Ex Parte Quirin made a distinction between lawful enemy
combatants and unlawful enemy combatants.9 The Court held that:
By universal agreement and practice, the law of war draws a distinction
between the armed forces and the peaceful populations of belligerent na-
tions and also between those who are lawful and unlawful combatants.
Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as prisoners of war
by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise subject to
capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and punish-
ment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerency unlaw-
ful. 92
Furthermore, the Court stated that "an enemy combatant who without
uniform comes secretly through the lines for the purpose of waging war by
destruction of life or property" is not afforded the status of prisoner of war.93
Although one of the eight petitioners was an American citizen, 9' the
Court, nonetheless, held that unlawful enemy combatants, regardless of citi-
zenship, could be tried in military tribunals. 9" Specifically, the court stated
that "[c]itizenship in the United States of an enemy belligerent does not re-
lieve him from the consequences of a belligerency which is unlawful be-
cause in violation of the law of war.
96
B. Ex Parte Quirin is Distinguishable from the Present Situation
The government's reliance on Ex Parte Quirin' is misplaced for several
reasons. First, in Ex Parte Quirin, the petitioners were charged with offenses
within a month of their capture.97 Here, Padilla and Hamdi have not been
charged with any offenses since their capture. Second, a military tribunal
tried the petitioners in Ex Parte Quirin soon after they were charged.9" Here,
the government has expressed no intention to try either Padilla or Hamdi in a
military tribunal in the near future. Third, the petitioners had access to coun-
sel during the military tribunal and the petition for writ of habeas corpus.
Here, neither Hamdi nor Padilla has had access to counsel.99 Finally and
89. Id. at 19-20.
90. Id. at 18-19.
91. Id. at 30-31.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 20.
95. Id. at 45.
96. Id. at 37.
97. Id. at 23.
98. Id.
99. Although the district court has granted Padilla supervised access to counsel with re-
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most importantly, the Court in Ex Parte Quirin reviewed the petition for writ
of habeas corpus."° Here, the government asserts that the President's deter-
mination of an individual as an enemy combatant is enough to satisfy the
"appropriate standard of judicial review,"101 and thus should not be second-
guessed. In other words, the government believes that its wartime decision
making powers are above judicial review.
The Court's actions in Ex Parte Quirin clearly illustrate the principle
that even during wartime the government is still subject to judicial review.
The fact that the Court may be deferential to the government's determination
of who is an enemy combatant does not translate into the absence of judicial
review entirely. Thus, because Ex Parte Quirin is distinguishable from the
present situation, it does not provide a valid authority for the government to
detain a United States citizen without access to counsel, without being
charged, without a trial, and without judicial review.
IV. INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
A. ICCPR Generally
On June 8, 1992, the United States ratified the ICCPR,"' which sets
forth certain inalienable rights that are due to all persons." 3 The United
States, however, ratified the ICCPR with the specific declaration that the
treaty was not self-executing.'" As a result, the treaty does not become the
supreme law of the land until an act of Congress makes it such. Nonetheless,
it is possible to use the ICCPR as persuasive authority to aid in the interpre-
tation of domestic law through indirect incorporation. 5
Article 9 of the ICCPR deals with an individual's right to liberty and se-
curity."° The General Comment to Article 9 states that if preventive deten-
gard to his petition for writ of habeas corpus, it remains to be determined whether the gov-
ernment will honor this ruling.
100. Quirin, 317 U.S. at 48. Ultimately, the Court denied the petition for habeas corpus
because it concluded that "the petitioners were held in lawful custody and did not show cause
for their discharge." Id.
101. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 15.
102. Status of Ratifications of the Principal International Human Rights Treaties, avail-
able at http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2003).
103. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S.
171 [hereinafter ICCPR].
104. United Nations, Declarations and Reservations (Feb. 5, 2002), available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/treaty5-asp.htm.
105. Mark A. Sherman, Representing Defendants in International Criminal Cases: As-
serting Human Rights and Other Defenses: Indirect Incorporation of Human Rights Treaty
Provisions in Criminal Cases in United States Courts, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 719 , 749
(1997). Specifically, the idea here is that for indirect incorporation to occur, international trea-
ties, like the ICCPR, "must be invoked as persuasive authority, bolstering constitutional and
statutory defenses or claims, and must be connected to customary international law." Id. at
724.
106. ICCPR, supra note 103, art. 9.
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tion is used to ensure public security, the detention must meet the provisions
set forth by the ICCPR.' 7 Specifically, the detention "must not be arbitrary,
and must be based on grounds and procedures established by law, informa-
tion of the reasons must be given and court control of the detention must be
available . . .'"" In addition, the General Comment states that Article 9 ap-
plies to all individuals who are arrested or detained, not just criminal defen-
dants."9
There are certain circumstances, however, during which certain rights
may be derogated under Article 4. In order to derogate, a State must meet
two conditions: 1) "the situation must amount to a public emergency which
threatens the life of the nation, and 2) the State party must have officially
proclaimed a state of emergency."" ° Additionally, "such measures are lim-
ited to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation. This re-
quirement relates to the duration, geographical coverage and material scope
of the state of emergency and any measures of derogation resorted to be-
cause of the emergency.""' Furthermore, the derogation cannot be inconsis-
tent with other obligations under international law."'
If a member state chooses to derogate from certain provisions, formal
requirements must be performed. Specifically, the derogating state party
must immediately inform the other State Parties."3 This is accomplished by
notifying the Secretary-General of the United Nations as to which article(s)
it intends to derogate from as well as the reasons for the derogation."'
107. Id. ICCPR General Comment 8, (4), Right to Liberty and Security of Persons (Art.
9) (June 30, 1982) [hereinafter Art. 9 General Comment].
108. Art. 9 General Comment, supra note 107. Article 9 states:
(1) Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be sub-
jected to arbitrary arrest or detention. No one shall be deprived of his liberty ex-
cept on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure as are established by
law. (2) Anyone who is arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the rea-
sons for his arrest and shall be promptly informed of any charges against him. (3)
Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before
a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and shall be
entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release.... (4) Anyone who is de-
prived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings be-
fore a court, in order that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his
detention and order his release if the detention is not lawful.
Id. art. 9(l)-(4).
109. Art. 9 General Comment, supra note 107, (1).
110. ICCPR, supra note 103, General Comment on Article 4, (2) (adopted July 24,
2001).
111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. art 4 (3).
114. Id.
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B. ICCPR as Applied to the Current Situation
Here, arguably, the government's determination of enemy combatants
may be deemed to be arbitrary. For example, the government's determina-
tion that Hamdi is an enemy combatant is contradictory to its determination
that Lindh is not an enemy combatant, because both Hamdi and Lindh were
captured in Afghanistan during combat against U.S. forces.
The fact that the government's subtle distinctions between these two
cases are not readily apparent is evidence of the need for clear and concise
guidelines in defining who is considered an enemy combatant. As it stands
now, the Padilla court has defined an enemy combatant as an "unlawful
combatant, acting as an associate of a terrorist organization whose opera-
tions do not meet the four criteria necessary to confer lawful combatant
status on its members and adherents.""' 5 In other words, the Padilla court has
reduced the term enemy combatant to simply mean someone who does not
qualify as a prisoner of war. This broad definition, however, does not ex-
plain the discrepant treatment among those individuals who do not qualify as
prisoners of war. The government's failure to account for these discrepancies
is in violation of the ICCPR's requirement that "preventive detentions must
be based on grounds and procedures established by law.""' 6
The ICCPR may be of much assistance in interpreting U.S. domestic
law. In deciding whether to grant the petition of a writ of habeas corpus, the
court should approach the issue in such a manner as to preserve compliance
with international law, namely Article 9 of the ICCPR which states that any-
one who is detained "shall be entitled to take proceedings before a court, in
order that court may decide without delay on the lawfulness of his detention
and order his release if the detention is not lawful""' 7 Therefore, if the
United States required judicial review of these detentions, then it would also
ensure compliance with Article 9 of the ICCPR.
V. PADILLA IS CORRECT IN PERMITTING JUDICIAL REVIEW TO DETERMINE
THE LAWFULNESS OF AN ENEMY COMBATANT'S DETENTION
A. Generally
The structure of the United States government was based in part on the
desire to avoid absolute power being vested in just one branch of govern-
ment. The Federalist Papers, No. 51, states clearly the intention of the draft-
ers to have a system of checks and balances:
To What expedient, then, shall we finally resort, for maintaining in prac-
tice the necessary partition of power among the several departments, as
115. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 593.
116. Art. 9 General Comment, supra note 107, (4).
117. ICCPR, supra note 103, art. 9 (4).
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laid down in the Constitution? The only answer that can be given is, that
as all these exterior provisions are found to be inadequate, the defect must
be supplied, by so contriving the interior structure of the government as
that its several constituent parts may, by their mutual relations, be the
means of keeping each other in their proper places." 8
A writ of habeas corpus (writ) permits a court to examine the lawfulness
of executive detention. "9 The Constitution, however, does allow for certain
situations where the writ may be derogated. Specifically, the Constitution
provides that: ."[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be sus-
pended, unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety re-
quire it."'20 Currently, Congress has taken no action to suspend the writ; in
fact, the government concedes that there has been no suspension. 2' There-
fore, without a suspension of the writ, the government's assertion that its
classification of enemy combatants is not subject to judicial review fails.
B. The Padilla Rationale
In Padilla, the court held that Padilla was not only entitled to judicial
review of his detention by the government, but access to counsel. 2 Because
the government did not dispute Padilla's right to petition for writ of habeas,
the court focused only on whether Padilla was entitled to counsel.'23 There-
fore, the court based its ruling on the presumption that individuals who are
designated enemy combatants are entitled to judicial review of the legality of
their detention.
The court correctly noted that because Padilla has the right to make
"fact-based arguments" in challenging the government's detention of him,
the "most convenient ... and ... most useful" way to do this is to grant him
access to counsel."" Otherwise, the court reasoned, congressional intent in
creating the rules that govern habeas corpus would be frustrated.' 25
According to Padilla, although the Sixth Amendment is not applicable
in this case because this is not a criminal proceeding, the Sixth Amendment
118. Padilla Amici Curiae Brief, supra note 46, at IV(B) (quoting Federalist No. 51
(James Madison)).
119. Michael C. Dorf, Who Decides Whether Yaser Hamdi, or Any Other Citizen, is an
Enemy Combatant? (Aug. 21, 2002), at http://writ.corporate.findlaw.com/dorf/20020821.
html.
120. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
121. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 3, at 32.
122. Padilla v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 610. Although the government did not dispute
an enemy combatant's right to habeas corpus, it did heavily stress that the court should not
second-guess their war time decision-making powers. Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, supra
note 3, at 11. In addition, the government attempted to claim other procedural barriers, such
as the court's lack of jurisdiction, to prevent the court from granting the writ of habeas corpus.
Id. at 1-2.
123. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 599.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 600.
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may be used to "inform the exercise of discretion here." 26 As a result, the
court held that discretion sided with allowing Padilla to have access to coun-
sel, but not without restrictions. 7
The court explained that this access would not have adverse effects on
the government's efforts to extract information from Padilla because the
right to counsel is "not in connection with questioning."'28 Furthermore, the
court imposed additional security measures on Padilla's right to counsel,
such as the ability for independent military personnel who are "insulated"
from Padilla's case to monitor counsel's consultations with Padilla.1
29
C. Looking Forward
If, in fact, the detention of an enemy combatant who is a United States
citizen is lawful, then certain procedural safeguards must be delineated.
Namely, the right to judicial review and access to counsel should be granted
to all individuals the government labels enemy combatants.
Additionally, in order to ensure not only the security of the United
States, but of citizens' individual rights, it is of utmost importance for the
government to define exactly what is meant by an enemy combatant. Fur-
thermore, the government should codify what types of circumstances will
give rise to a determination of being labeled an enemy combatant as opposed
to a defendant in a criminal proceeding. These measures will serve several
purposes. First, it will give the public a better understanding of what stan-
dards the government is using in detaining United States citizens. Second, it
will foster a sense of trust and confidence in the general public that the mili-
tary and the government are acting in accord with standardized protocols.
Finally, it will ensure that the United States is in compliance with interna-
tional law, namely the ICCPR.
Transparency of government, within reasonable limits given the classi-
fied nature of national security, is key to achieving these goals. A transparent
government, however, can only exist if the rule of law is followed. Thus, it is
imperative to create objective standards for the determination of who is an
enemy combatant and to ensure the right to judicial review for those indi-
viduals labeled as such.
126. Id. at 603. Article 14 of the ICCPR also provides that criminal defendants are enti-
tled to counsel. ICCPR, supra note 103, art. 14 (3)(d). Thus, it is also possible to use the
ICCPR to bolster the court's proposition that enemy combatants are entitled to counsel when
having a court review the lawfulness of their detention.
127. Padilla, 233 F. Supp. 2d at 605.
128. Id. at 603.
129. Id. at 604.
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CONCLUSION
The freedoms we have now should not be compromised by our nation's
war on terrorism. To do so would entail the gradual evisceration of the prin-
ciples upon which our nation was founded. The United States government
would like to have its citizens believe that it is only temporarily infringing
upon citizens' rights in the name of peace, however, once a single conces-
sion is made, it becomes easier and easier to continue down the same path
strengthened with precedents that are based on flawed foundations.
As George Orwell wrote in his novel 1984, "[wjhen war is continuous
there is no such thing as military necessity. Technical progress can cease and
the most palpable facts can be denied or disregarded .... A peace that was
truly permanent would be the same as a permanent war." 3' The concentra-
tion of power in one body of government at the expense of individual free-
doms was a threat that the drafters of the Constitution feared. As a result, our
Constitution provides for a system of checks and balances to ensure that no
one government branch will have unlimited and unfettered discretion to do
as it sees fit.
The ideals and visions that the drafters had in mind certainly did not en-
tail the slippery slope that is facing us in the cases of Padilla and Hamdi. The
Padilla court's decision that Padilla is entitled to have access to counsel with
respect to his petition for writ of habeas corpus correctly reinforces the prin-
ciple that the government is subject to judicial review for its actions, even
during the war against terrorism.
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